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an attorney who might sponsor or solicit such type of testimony. The physician and lawyer engaging in this type of practice fortunately are very few,
but they are usually well-known to the lawyers and doctors. When an obvious
violation of ethics in this regard is noted in any particular case, proper steps
should be taken to furnish the respective disciplinary boards or committees
of the professions with all facts relative to any breach of ethics.

The New Federal Judicial Code
By the HON. ROYCE H. SAVAGE
U. S. District Judge for the Northern District of Oklahoma
EDITOR'S NOTE: The following explanation of the new Federal judicial code
was presented by Judge Savage before the Annual Conference of the Tenth
Judicial Circuit on July 8, 1949.
The enactment of H. R. 3214 bearing the title "An Act to revise,
codify and enact into law Title 28 of the United States Code entitled
'Judicial Code and Judiciary' " was a monumental achievement of utmost importance to the bench and bar. This revision ranks in importance with the
Judiciary Act of 1789 and the Judicial Code of 1911.
The purpose of the bill, as the title implies, was to codify and revise
the laws relating to the federal judiciary and judicial procedure. No revision
of these laws had been made since 1911, and the judicial code enacted in
that year did not include all of the laws related to the subject. A tremendous
volume of additional legislation in this field had been enacted since 1911.
Much of the statutory material pertaining to the judiciary was in archaic
and ambiguous language and many statutory provisions had been repealed
by implication by later statutes. Many statutes relating to procedure had
been rendered wholly obsolete by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Obviously, the project to codify and revise the statutes dealing with the
judiciary and its procedures was very nuch in the public interest in order that
the law in this important field might be clarified and made more readily
available.
Revision, as distinguished from codification, required the substitution of
plain language for awkward terms, reconciliation of conflicting laws, repeal of
superseded sections, and consolidation of related provisions. By enacting the
bill into positive law as Title 28 of the United States Code, such title thereby became the law rather than merely prima facie -evidence of the law.
As finally enacted, the revision included all applicable laws in effect on
January 5, 1948. The revised code became effective on September 1, 1948.
Expert Advisory Committees Appointed
The Revision Committee of the House, with commendable foresight, enlisted the aid of a group of experts in approaching the task. They first obtained the services of the West Publishing Company and the Edward Thompson Company, two of the leading law publishing firms and compilers of the
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United States Code. An impartial advisory committee was appointed, composed of outstanding men with years of practical experience at the bar and
on the bench. The chairman of this committee was Judge Floyd E. Thompson, former chief justice of the Illinois Supreme Court, and among its members were Judge Justin Miller, former judge of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, Judge John B. Sanborn, Judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and Walter P. Armstrong, former president of the American Bar Association. This committee
was assisted by Judge John J. Parker, Chief Judge of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, who rendered valuable service as a judicial consultant. Judge Alexander Holtzoff and Professor James W. Moore, of
Yale University, two experts in the field of federal procedure, assisted the
committee as special consultants.
The Judicial Conference appointed a committee on the revision of the
judicial code, which likewise made a substantial contribution. Judge Albert
B. Mars, Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

was chairman of that committee. The Chief Justice appointed a committee
of Supreme Court judges which aided in the solution of problems pertaining
to that court.
When the work was commenced, letters were mailed to all federal
judges, United States attorneys, deans of law schools and presidents of bar
associations inviting suggestions and criticisms. Any suggestions received
were studied, cataloged and made available to the revision staff. As the work
progressed, the advice of government officials was sought with respect to

problems affecting particular departments or agencies.
The material for revision was divided into six major categories. Part I
provides for organization of courts; Part II treats of the United States attorneys and marshals; Part III covers court officers and employees; Part IV
sets forth the provisions on jurisdiction and venue; Part V deals with procedure; and Part VI takes up particular proceedings. Within these parts, the
subject matter was arranged under appropriate chapter heads. The numbering system makes allowance for future legislation. Chapters were given odd
numbers leaving the even numbers available for related chapters containing
future acts. Sufficient section numbers were left between chapters to accommodate anticipated growth.
Concise Style Reduces Size of Code
A clear and uniform style was used. Concise and direct expressions
were employed rather than verbose, redundant and circuitous language. In
many instances, similar sections were consolidated without making fundamental changes. For example, three short sections in Chapter 43 pertaining
to appointment, tenure and fees of United States commissioners consolidated
51 sections of existing law scattered throughout the United States Code
Annotated. Section 507 outlines the duties of United States attorneys and
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consolidates 14 sections. Section 456, which deals with traveling expenses
of judges and Section 553 covering expenses of United States marshals consolidate 8 sections each. By such consolidation, bulk was reduced and repetitious, overlapping provisions telescoped with resulting improvement of style
and substance.
In carrying on the work of revision, the committee recognized the inadvisability of proposing changes in existing law which might provoke any
substantial controversies. If the bill had included remedial legislation with
respect to controversial matters, opposition undoubtedly would have developed which would have jeopardized the enactment of the bill. It was
deemed advisable to avoid changes in the existing law that would not meet
with substantially unanimous approval in order to ensure the success of the
undertaking. It was thought that the more controversial matters could be
settled later by introducing separate bills dealing with a particular subject
matter.
While the many changes made by revision of the code are not, with
respect to each change, perhaps, of great consequence, nevertheless when considered as a whole they undoubtedly add up to a very substantial improvement
and modernization of the law pertaining to the federal judiciary and judicial
procedure.
A bill was recently passed by Congress and approved by the President
on May 24, amending the new code and likewise amending Title 18, entitled "Crimes and Criminal Procedure". The amending bill was enacted in
order to correct typographical and other minor errors, make the language of
some sections conform more closely to the original law and remove ambiguities and supply omissions which had been discovered. It also incorporated into
revised Title 28 those laws enacted by the 80th Congress too late to be "ncluded in the revision bill. Any reference to particular code provisions will
take into account these amendments.
There were changes of nomenclature of which the bench and bar should
take notice. "The United States Circuit Court of Appeals" is now "The
United States Court of Appeals". The Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia is now one of the eleven courts of appeal. The statutory name
of a district court is "The United States District Court" for the particular
district. The senior judge of a court of appeals and of a district court is now
known as the "chief judge". The chief justice of the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, the chief justice of the Court of Claims and the
chief justice of the District Court for the District of Columbia now each
bear the title of "chief judge" of their respective courts. The justices of such
courts are now referred to as judges. The Conference of Senior Circuit
Judges is now known as the "Judicial Conference of the United States." Its
membership consists of the Chief Justice and the chief judge of each of the
eleven circuits.

DICTA

Costs To Be Included in Judgment
The statutes covering the subject matter of costs to be charged in civil
actions in the district courts have been consolidated and greatly simplified.
One important change in procedure has been effected. It is provided that
a bill of costs shall be filed in the case and, upon allowance, included in the
judgment or decree." This provision has been implemented by a local rule
recently adopted. This rule requires the party recovering a judgment for
costs to file with the clerk within ten days after entry of judgment, a verified
bill of costs by use of a form that will be provided for that purpose. The clerk
will tax the costs upon the filing of the bill, but any items included in the
bill may be reviewed by the court if a motion to retax costs is filed within
five days. It is important to realize that the judgment will not include costs
recovered by the prevailing party uniess the bill of costs is filed as required
by the rule. Furthermore, the action of the clerk in taxing costs in conformity
with the bill of costs filed becomes final unless the motion to retax is filed
within five days.
The original jurisdiction of the district courts is covered by Chapter 85
of the revised code. That chapter consists of six pages containing 29 short
sections. While Section 41 of the 1940 edition of Title 28, United States
Code Annotated, contained the jurisdictional provisions pertaining to the
district courts at the time the judicial code was codified in 1911, thereafter
more than 150 additional jurisdictional provisions were enacted by Congress
which are found in 29 other titles of the 1940 edition. The revision did not
result in substantial changes in the original jurisdiction of the district courts.
However, one new jurisdictional provision seems to be worthy of special
notice. It is provided that "district courts' shall have original jurisdiction,
concurrent with state courts, of any action on a bond executed under any
law of the United States."
Changes have been made in the law relating to venue of the district
courts. Diversity cases may be brought only in the district court where all
plaintiffs or all defendants reside. Actions wherein jurisdiction is not founded
solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought only in the district where all
defendants reside. These provisions do not constitute a departure from the
existing law. But an additional provision has been inserted to the effect that the
residence of a corporation for venue purposes is in any judicial district in
which it is incorporated, or licensed to do business or is doing business.
This provision obviously enlarges the venue of the district courts in actions
brought against corporate defendants. However, a considerable enlargement
of the venue of actions against corporations had resulted from the decision of
the Supreme Court in Neirbo Company v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation, 308 U. S. 165, holding, in effect, that a corporation, by appointing a
statutory service agent in compliance with state law, thereby consented to be
sued in any federal judicial district in such state. But this provision fixing
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the residence of corporations for venue purposes will set at rest many complicated questions raised with respect to the application of the rule in the
Neirbo case.
New Provisions Regarding Venue
Two new provisions have been added which appear to merit special attention. First, if a case is filed in a district which does not have venue of
the action, the court may dismiss or, in the interest of justice, may transfer the
cause to any district in which it could have been brought. Of course, timely
objection must be interposed to the venue, otherwise a waiver results. This
is an amended section. It originally previded that, if the venue was laid in
the wrong district, the court "shall" transfer to a district in which the action
could have been brought. It became apparent that a plaintiff might deliberately bring a suit in a district without venue of the action but where he could
get service on a defendant and such service would carry over if and when
the case was transferred to a district in which the action could have been
broilght. It was thought advisable to vest discretion in the court to either
dismiss or order the cause transferred in furtherance of justice. Second, a
district court having venue may, in the interest of justice, transfer any civil
action to any other district where it might have been brought. Two cases
were recently decided by the Supreme Court in which the contention was
made, in one case, that this statute does not authorize transfer of an action
brought under the Federal Employers Liability Act and, in the other case,
that it does not authorize the transfer of a case brought by the Government
under the Clayton Act. These contentions were rejected by the Supreme
Court and the orders entered by the respective district courts transferring
the cases were upheld.
These two sections authorizing transfer of cases have been implemented
by a local rule requiring the party procuring an order of transfer to file within
twenty days in the court to which the cause is removed a certified copy of all
papers on file in the action.
The new code effectuates a radical change in the procedure for removal
of actions from state courts to the federal courts. The new procedure calls
for the filing in the United States District Court of a verified petition containing a short and plain statement of the facts permitting removal, together
with a copy of all process, pleadings and orders served upon the removing
party in the action. The petition must be filed within 20 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of the copy of the
initial pleadings setting forth the claim for relief or within 20 days after
service of summons if initial pleading has not been filed in court and is not
required to he served on defendant, whichever period is shorter. If the case
stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a petition for removal may be
filed within 20 days after receipt by the defendant of a copy of an amended
pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it first may be ascertained
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that the case has become removable. It must be accompanied by a bond
conditioned for payment of all costs should it be determined that the case
was improperly removed. Written notice of the filing of the. petition and
bond must be given to all adverse parties and a copy of the petition must be
filed with the clerk of the state court.
One significant change which has been made with respect to removable
actions is disclosed by the following provision:
"Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action,
which would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or
more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire
case may be removed and the district court may determine all issues
therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters not otherwise
within its original jurisdiction."
This language is substituted for the old "separable controversy" provision.
Cases may not now be removed upon the ground that a separable controversy
is disclosed by the petition. A separate and independent claim or cause df action within the original jurisdiction of the United States district courts must
be alleged. The discretion specifically given to the court to remand all nonremovable causes of action joined with the removable cause of action is noteworthy. It was my first impression that the elimination of the "separable
controversy" provision marked one of the more salutary improvements made.
It seems that I have never failed to experience difficulty in determining
whether a separable controversy has been alleged. But a recent experience
convinces me that I may have about the same difficulty in deciding when a
separate and independent claim has been stated.
Code Adopts Conference Recommendations on Habeas Corpus
The chapter on habeas corpus is of great importance and of particular
interest to the circuit judges and judges of districts in which penal institutions
are located. The problems arising from the frequent resort to the writ of
habaes corpus by inmates of penal institutions, both federal and state, first
received the attention of the Judicial Conference of the United States in
1942 when the late Chief Justice Stone appointed a committee to make a
study of the matter. Judge Vaught was a member of that committee. Two
separate bills prepared by the committee were approved by the conference
and caused to be introduced in Congress. These proposed bills engaged our
attention and, at the meeting of our conference in 1947, a resolution urging
that the bills be passed was unanimously adopted. The code provisions enact
into law substantially the recommendations of the Judicial Conference embodied in these bills. Four important things are accomplished by the code
provisions pertaining to habeas corpus: (1)repetitious applications for the
writ by persons convicted of crime are forestalled by a provision invoking
the principle of res judicata in a modified form; (2) a simplified procedure is
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established for the hearing of the cases; (3) in respect of federal prisoners,
provision is made for relief by motion filed in the sentencing court and the
right to relief by habeas corpus in such cases is extremely limited; and (4) in
case of state prisoners, resort to the lower federal courts is practically eliminated where an adequate remedy is provided by state law.
One or two other additions might be of interest. Prior to the revision of
the code, the state law governed the qualifications and exemptions of jurors
in the federal courts. The new code for the first time sets up a federal standard of qualifications for jury service. It is provided, however, that persons
who are incompetent to serve as jurors in state courts are ineligible to serve
in United States district courts. Exemptions under state law do not apply.
A final judgment may now be registered in any other district by merely
filing a certified copy of the judgment, and may be enforced in the same
manner as judgments entered in the district where registered. It is not now
necessary to bring suit on a judgment in another district. The advisory
committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1937 recommended the
adoption of a rule providing for registration of judgments in other districts
but the proposed rule was not approved by the Supreme Court.
This new code covers entirely too much subject matter to justify an
attempt to outline all of the changes in the law which it brought about. I
could only hope to hit the high spots and call attention to matters to which
I attach some importance. If I have succeeded in arousing the curiosity of
the members of the bar to the extent that you will be persuaded to examine
this code in connection with your federal court litigation, I will feel that
my undertaking has been a success.

Attorney-General Rules on Retirement Act
The following letter from Attorney General John W. Metzger was sent
to Philip S. Van Cise as Chairman of the Judiciary Committee of the Colorado
Bar Association on August 19, 1949:
Dear Mr. Van Cise:
Your letter of August 13, 1949, as chairman of the Judiciary Committee
of the Colorado Bar Association, I assume, transmits a copy of a letter dated
July 22, 1949, from C. S. Fredrickson, President of the County Judge Association, concerning certain phases of H. B. No. 154, the so-called Judges
Retirement Act.
1. To what counties does the act apply?
2. Is the population to be determined by the local federal census, or
what?
3. Does the 10 years of service begin at and after the effective date of
the act, or is it controlled by the number of ycars of service of the judge before
and after its passage?
In answer to the first question, Sec. 1 of H. B. No. 154 reads as follows:

